What happened

Russia is supplying Iran with missiles as Tehran rebuilds its arsenal, according to Bloomberg reporting cited by Haaretz on October 10, 2026. The reporting states Iran retains production capacity and substantial ballistic missile stocks despite eight months of US-Israeli airstrikes.

What is verified

• Bloomberg reporting, cited by Haaretz (Oct 10, 2026), says Russia is supplying missiles to Iran.
• The reporting states Iran retains ballistic missile production capacity and substantial stocks.
• US-Israeli airstrikes against Iran have been ongoing for roughly eight months (since Feb 28, 2026).
• Western intelligence assessed in June that Iran retained ~75% of its prewar arsenal (Bloomberg reporting, carried by Newsmax/NewsBeep, Oct 10, 2026).
• Britain's navy says at least 10 vessels were struck near Hormuz in the past week; oil above $100/barrel; tanker charters ~$1.2M/day (same).
• Iran reportedly test-fired multiple ballistic missiles from Tehran and Alborz provinces on Sunday Oct 11 (Türkiye Today, Oct 11, 2026; C14 News, Oct 11, 2026).
• Bloomberg Economics analysis, carried by Türkiye Today (Oct 11, 2026), says Iran has launched more than 4,000 Shahed drones and at least 2,000 ballistic missiles since Feb 28.
• Trump said late Monday he does not believe China or Russia are helping Iran 'at all,' telling Truth Social they have 'too much to lose' (Reuters, Oct 13, 2026) — on-record statement contradicting the Bloomberg assessment.
• IDF raised alert level across all fronts amid reports Iran launched 30 ballistic missiles (Israel Hayom, Oct 15 — single outlet, attributed)
• Israeli security officials: no change in Iran intelligence assessment justifying an operation in the next 2-3 weeks; Iran's missile rebuilding slow and partial (Times of Israel/Channel 12, Oct 15 — reported)
• IRGC mass missile/drone drills Oct 11-13: ballistic-missile test-firings reported from Tehran, Alborz, Isfahan and Yazd over three days, with footage of Shahed-136 waves and IRIAF activity (Turkiye Today/The Jewish Edition/JFeed, Oct 11-13 — STRONGLY_SUPPORTED for the drills; counts per Channel 14/IRGC-linked Saberin News — ATTRIBUTED, unverified)
• Trump pledged on social media not to attack Iran before the Nov. 3 midterm elections (Ynet carrying Bloomberg; Turkiye Today, Oct 11 — STRONGLY_SUPPORTED)
• Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said Tuesday that the transfer of Iran's enriched uranium material to Russia was not discussed during Sergey Lavrov's Tehran visit, and called speculation about an agreement to remove 400 kg of 60%-enriched uranium from Iran 'entirely baseless' (Trend via MENAFN; APA, Oct 20 — on-record remarks, verified); he stressed Russia's significant role in the JCPOA negotiations and Moscow's readiness to take de-escalation steps (cross-linked to Rezaei's no-exit statement, st-003 v54)
• The Financial Times published an Oct 20, 2026 investigation (Miles Johnson, Max Seddon, Charles Clover) describing a covert Russia-Iran supersonic-missile program codenamed C430L, based on leaked correspondence, travel records and military patents; the underlying claims remain attributed pending official confirmation (relay: The Gaze, Israel Defense, Calcalist, New Vision News).
• Oct 31 evening Tehran time (Tabnak/BitRun interview, via Al Jazeera liveblog, Clash Report, Turkiye Today): Army spokesman Akraminia says the Su-35 purchase is complete, pilot training is complete, jets were due before the war and will be received only after the war ends; no jets have arrived. VERIFIED as his remarks; no Russian confirmation or delivery detail in accounts checked.
• Nov 1, Sunday (Reuters investigation, carried by Vijesti Nov 1 and ghall Oct 31 citing Reuters): Iran operates a network of more than 5,000 'MOD' agencies registered at its defence ministry's Tehran address, through which it has imported at least $2 billion of military-related goods since January 2025 despite the US naval blockade and Western sanctions; agency MOD 346428 alone imported rocket fuel, explosives, drone/missile components and launcher-capable trucks from January 2025 to June 2026, arriving via the Caspian from Russia, overland from Central Asia and by cargo flight from China, with shipments recorded as originating in China, Russia and Germany. VERIFIED as Reuters' findings as carried (document review with 240 Analytics, ~19,000 import records sampled, four experts confirming missile/drone usability); the dual-use caveat is carried, and no finished-missile delivery figure is claimed from this investigation.

What remains disputed

The types, quantities, and delivery timeline of the missiles have not been publicly specified. The claim that eight months of strikes failed to degrade Iran's missile capability will be contested by US and Israeli officials; no official US/Israeli assessment is reflected in the cited reporting. Russia's strategic intent — defensive resupply vs. deepening war partnership — is unstated.

Why it matters

If accurate, this is the clearest evidence yet that the US-Israeli air campaign has not achieved its stated aim of degrading Iran's strike capability — and that Moscow is willing to backfill it. That combination hardens Iran's negotiating position and lengthens the war's expected runway.

Strategic context

Russia and Iran deepened military cooperation after 2022, most visibly through Iranian drones in Ukraine. The reverse flow — Russian munitions into Iran — marks a new phase. It follows the Putin–Pezeshkian meeting in Ashgabat, where Moscow pledged mediation while visibly tightening its embrace of Tehran.

Competing interpretations

Reading one: this is routine alliance maintenance — Moscow resupplying a partner to keep the war grinding and keep Washington distracted. Reading two: it is a deterrent signal to Washington and Jerusalem ahead of any escalation. Reading three (skeptical): the reporting may overstate deliveries or conflate agreements with delivered hardware; the physical evidence is not public.

What changed since last update

SUNDAY — REUTERS INVESTIGATION: IRAN'S 5,000-AGENCY 'MOD' PROCUREMENT NETWORK HAS IMPORTED AT LEAST $2 BILLION OF MILITARY-RELATED GOODS SINCE JANUARY 2025 DESPITE THE BLOCKADE — Reuters has identified a secret network of more than 5,000 agencies, all registered under names beginning with 'MOD' (for Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, MODAFL) at the ministry's Tehran address, through which Iran has imported hardware, explosives and heavy trucks worth at least $2 billion since January 2025, bypassing the US naval blockade and Western sanctions (Reuters investigation, carried by Vijesti, Nov 1, 16:01 CET, and by ghall, Oct 31, citing Reuters — VERIFIED as Reuters' findings as carried; the underlying shipment records are Reuters' document review, not independently re-checked here). Reuters, working with risk consultancy 240 Analytics, based the work on thousands of Iranian banking and government documents, business-registry data and import records, reviewing a sample of about 19,000 import records; the agencies list the same Tehran address and a founding date of February 11, 1979, though documents show most were actually founded in 2013, and 36 agencies held a combined $1.2 billion in foreign-exchange accounts at the end of 2024 (same). One agency, MOD 346428, imported vast quantities of rocket fuel, explosives and weapons components needed to build drones and missiles, plus heavy trucks that can serve as mobile launchers, over the 18 months from January 2025 to June 2026; the equipment arrived by cargo ship across the Caspian Sea from Russia, by truck from Central Asia and by cargo plane from China, with a large portion of shipments recorded as originating in China, Russia and Germany (same). Four sanctions and weapons experts who analysed Reuters' findings confirmed that many of the imported materials could be used in Iran's missile and drone programmes; former senior US Treasury official Miad Maleki called the network 'the lifeblood of the Iranian military during this conflict, but also for many years before' and 'the entire ecosystem of the Iranian military's commercial operations', while Columbia researcher Peter Salisbury called it 'an industrial-scale attempt to renew or expand Iran's existing drone and missile fleet' (same). Reuters found no evidence that any of the numbered agencies in the documents had been placed on a Western sanctions list, and notes experts' dual-use caveat: a large portion of the material, including explosives, could also have civilian uses (same). Responses in the same reporting: a US Treasury spokeswoman said the US had 'cut off the regime's economic supply lines' and was 'always ten steps ahead'; China's Foreign Ministry said it was 'not familiar with the situation' and opposed attempts to 'maliciously link regional hostilities to China'; a UAE official denied the allegations about UAE-origin goods as 'completely baseless'; Iran's institutions contacted by Reuters, including its UN delegation in Geneva and the president's office, did not respond, and the Russian Defence Ministry, the White House and US Central Command did not respond to requests for comment (same). PLACEMENT: this is a procurement-system finding, not a finished-weapon delivery: it does NOT confirm v14's 327 aviation-missile figure, any Su-35 delivery in v15, or any single Russian missile shipment — shipments recorded as originating in Russia are one route among China, Germany and Central Asian overland routes, and the dual-use caveat is carried, not stripped. It does, however, materially extend the stack's core question — how Tehran keeps rebuilding missile and drone stocks while under blockade and bombardment — by documenting the financing and import machinery behind it, and it sits alongside, not instead of, the Russian-supply reporting in v12/v14. SATURDAY EVENING — ARMY SPOKESMAN: SU-35 PURCHASE COMPLETE, JETS TO ARRIVE ONLY AFTER THE WAR — Iranian Army spokesman Brig. Gen. Mohammad Akraminia said in an interview with the Iranian outlets Tabnak and BitRun, published Saturday evening Tehran time, that Iran has completed the purchase of Russian Su-35 fighter jets and will receive them only once the war is over: the preliminary work, including the purchase and the contract, was handled by bodies outside the army, pilot training is complete, and the aircraft had been due to arrive before the war began (Al Jazeera liveblog, Oct 31, 22:15 GMT entry; Clash Report, Oct 31; Turkiye Today, Nov 1 — VERIFIED as his on-record remarks in the interview; Persian-language outlets stressed no jets have arrived). Akraminia also said the air force will emerge stronger and better equipped after the war (same). PLACEMENT: this gives the future-Su-35 line a delivery timeline from the army spokesman — it extends v14's reported aviation-missile supplies for a future Su-35 fleet (deliveries scheduled through 2027 in that report) but does NOT confirm v14's 327-missile figure, any delivery, or any jet count, and no Russian comment or delivery detail appears in the accounts checked. Distinct from v13's Zelenskyy intelligence-sharing claim. SU-35 AVIATION-MISSILE SUPPLIES DETAIL REPORTED - News.Az, citing the Ukrainian defence outlet Militarnyi, reported that Russia has supplied Iran with at least 327 air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles intended for Iran's future Su-35 fleet, including components and production orders linked to Kh-38, K-73, K-77 and Kh-31 missiles (news.az, Oct 24 - ATTRIBUTED, single-chain; the underlying documentation was not independently reviewed). Per the report, Russian defence enterprises placed missile-related orders between 2023 and 2025, with some deliveries scheduled through 2027 - a timeline the report says matches expected Su-35 deliveries around 2027. This would deepen the Bloomberg/Western-officials Russian-supply line (v12) with aviation-weapons specifics; kept as an attributed claim until corroborated. ZELENSKYY: RUSSIA MAY HAVE SHARED INTELLIGENCE WITH IRAN — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested Russia had shared intelligence with Iran, including satellite data (Ukrinform, Oct 20 23:22 GMT — ATTRIBUTED, Ukrainian-official claim; no evidence presented, no Russian response recorded at build time). The claim extends the April Ukrainian-intelligence accusation (Russian imagery surveys of Middle East military and critical sites for Iranian targeting, carried by the Times of Israel) now tied to an on-record presidential statement — kept as claim-vs-claim with Moscow's silence, not as fact. Held per reliability rules: the single-anonymous-chain report that Iran had transferred short-range ballistic missiles to Russia (CNN/WSJ 'last week' reporting via Japan Times tag carry, Oct 21) stays out — no independent corroboration found. Cross-linked to st-003 v59 (US carrier posture) and st-005 (Moscow mediation track). FT INVESTIGATION NAMES COVERT RUSSIA-IRAN SUPERSONIC MISSILE PROGRAM (C430L) — the Financial Times published an investigation (Miles Johnson, Max Seddon, Charles Clover; Wednesday cover story released the night of Oct 20) describing a multiyear covert program, codenamed C430L, under which Russia's state arms exporter Rosoboronexport and missile manufacturer NPO Mashinostroyenia (under U.S. sanctions since 2014) assisted Iran in developing ramjet propulsion for a new class of supersonic cruise missiles. The FT, citing leaked Russian correspondence, travel records and military patents, says the program began in 2023, a contract was signed with Iran's defense ministry in November 2023, Russian specialists — including NPO Mashinostroyenia's then-deputy head Alexander Dergachov — made repeated trips to Iran, and Iran has built and flight-tested a ramjet engine whose telemetry Russian engineers later analyzed, troubleshooting fuel supply, combustion stability, air intake and nozzle design. Missile experts cited by the FT say the technology is almost certainly intended for anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles — a weapon class that could threaten U.S. warships, including carriers, in the Middle East — and the FT calls it 'one of the most significant known transfers of strategic military technology from Moscow to Tehran.' CLAIM STATUS: ATTRIBUTED (FT investigation) — no government confirmation from Moscow or Tehran; the reporting does not establish an operational weapon (no evidence of operational deployment at this stage). This directly challenges Trump's Oct 13 on-record denial (v7) that China or Russia are helping Iran 'at all' — claim vs counter-claim, both kept on the ledger. Relayed by The Gaze, Israel Defense, Calcalist, New Vision News. BAGHAEI DENIES URANIUM-TRANSFER TALK — Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said at his Tuesday briefing that the transfer of Iran's enriched uranium material to Russia was NOT discussed during Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Tehran visit, and called speculation about an agreement to remove 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60% from Iran 'entirely baseless' (Trend via MENAFN; APA, Oct 20 — VERIFIED as Baghaei's on-record remarks). Baghaei stressed Russia played a significant role in the JCPOA negotiations and that Moscow consistently signals readiness to take steps toward de-escalation. Read alongside Rezaei's Tuesday statement that none of Iran's enriched nuclear material will leave the country under any circumstances (st-003, v54). Cross-linked to st-005 (Lavrov visit) and st-003. LAVROV IN TEHRAN: RUSSIAN SPECIALISTS TO GRADUALLY RETURN TO WAR-DAMAGED BUSHEHR PLANT — Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, on his first Tehran visit since the war began (Oct 19, his fourth in-person FM meeting with Abbas Araghchi in 2026), announced that Russian specialists who left the US-damaged Bushehr nuclear plant would gradually return; Moscow framed the visit around mediation "aimed at preventing the return of a large-scale war" amid stalled US–Iran talks (Al Jazeera; Rudaw via Tasnim/Sputnik — VERIFIED as Lavrov's remarks). Cross-linked to st-005 (Ashgabat/Lavrov visit) — this stack tracks the nuclear-arsenal rebuild thread; Araghchi's "never worked so closely" X post sits on st-005's ledger. OCT 11-13 — IRGC MASS MISSILE/DRONE DRILLS — Iran conducted its largest missile and drone exercise since the Feb 28 offensive: multiple outlets report ballistic-missile test-firings from Tehran, Alborz, Isfahan and Yazd over three days, with footage circulating of Shahed-136 waves and IRIAF activity over Tehran (Turkiye Today/The Jewish Edition/JFeed, Oct 11-13 — STRONGLY_SUPPORTED for the drills themselves). Counts (30+ missiles, 136 drones) are per Channel 14 and IRGC-linked Saberin News; The Jewish Edition flags some footage as possibly recycled and hypersonic-launch claims as unverified (ATTRIBUTED for counts). The drills are the first physical demonstration of the arsenal the Oct 9 Bloomberg Western-official assessment said survived U.S.-Israeli strikes. TRUMP NO-STRIKE PLEDGE WINDOW — Trump publicly pledged on social media not to attack Iran before the Nov. 3 midterm elections (reported Oct 11 by Ynet carrying Bloomberg; Turkiye Today — STRONGLY_SUPPORTED). The pledge effectively names the political window during which Western assessments say Iran — and any Russian resupply — can rebuild the arsenal unmolested. NEGATIVE FINDINGS — no new primary evidence of Russian missile deliveries since the Oct 9 Bloomberg report; the FT C430L story is Sept 1-2 recirculation (excluded); a Jane's-attributed Su-35/S-400 acceleration claim exists only via an unsourced YouTube Short (excluded); Anna Kelly's on-record rejection stands unchanged. IDF ALERT LEVEL UP — Israel Hayom (Oct 15): following reports that Iran launched 30 ballistic missiles, the IDF raised its alert level across all fronts and is preparing for the possibility of a targeted strike on Iran (single outlet, attributed). Israeli assessments cited in the same piece: US strikes in the Strait of Hormuz would not have immediate repercussions for Israel unless they triggered a significant escalation; in that scenario Iranian leaders could deploy their recovering ballistic missile arsenal against additional Gulf-state targets (assessment, attributed). ASSESSMENT UNCHANGED — Israeli security officials say there has been no change in the intelligence assessment of Iran that would justify an Israeli-American operation in the next two to three weeks, and that Iran's ballistic-missile rebuilding remains slow and partial (Times of Israel via Channel 12, Oct 15 — reported). TESTS CONTINUE — reports earlier this week: Iran conducted several ballistic missile tests as part of a gradual, limited effort to rebuild its missile arsenal; Israeli defense officials assess the activity as monitored and not a sufficient change in the threat level to justify an immediate operation (matzav, Oct 15 — attributed). Sits against Trump's v7 denial that Russia is helping Iran at all — both remain on the ledger as claim vs. counter-claim. TRUMP DENIES FOREIGN HELP TO IRAN — Trump said late Monday he does not believe China and Russia are helping Iran 'at all,' telling Truth Social they have 'too much to lose' and that the US 'would know about it, and know about it very fast' (Reuters, Oct 13). On-record presidential statement; it directly contradicts the Bloomberg Russia-to-Iran missile assessment tracked in this stack (v1/v4) — the ledger keeps both as claim vs. counter-claim, not as resolved fact. (Fuller treatment on the Iran-war stack.) SUNDAY BALLISTIC-MISSILE TESTS — Iran reportedly test-fired multiple ballistic missiles from Tehran and Alborz provinces on Sunday Oct 11, per Türkiye Today (carrying AA photos) and C14 News — C14 describes it as the first such test since Operation 'Roaring Lion' (attributed reports). WAR TEMPO NUMBERS — Bloomberg Economics analysis carried by Türkiye Today says Iran has launched more than 4,000 Shahed drones and at least 2,000 ballistic missiles since Feb 28 (attributed). FT CLAIM (UNVERIFIED, single-source) — the Zambian Observer reports a Financial Times investigation uncovered a clandestine program in which Russian specialists are cooperating with Iran to develop supersonic cruise missiles designed to threaten US Navy vessels — treated as alleged pending corroboration. NUMBERS AROUND THE CLAIM — outlets carrying Bloomberg's report added the intelligence details: Western intelligence assessed in June that Iran still held roughly 75% of its prewar arsenal, and Israel estimated Iran had ~2,500 ballistic missiles when the war began Feb 28 (Newsmax/NewsBeep, Oct 10, carrying Bloomberg). Britain's navy says Iran stepped up attacks on shipping, striking at least 10 vessels near Hormuz in the past week; oil is trading above $100/barrel and tanker charter costs have climbed to ~$1.2M/day from under $50,000 pre-war (same). The White House rejection (v4) stands. WHITE HOUSE REJECTS THE BLOOMBERG ASSESSMENT — a White House spokeswoman, Anna Kelly, rejected the Western-official assessment that Iran preserved its missile/drone factories and remains well-stocked despite eight months of US-Israeli strikes, telling Bloomberg that Operation Midnight Hammer 'obliterated Iran's nuclear facilities' and Operation Epic Fury 'successfully destroyed the conventional shield' Iran sought to create, including its ballistic missiles, production facilities and navy (Times of Israel; Ynet, Oct 11, carrying Bloomberg's report). Kelly's rejection puts an on-record administration counter-claim directly against the anonymous Western-official assessment (v3) — both are publicly unverifiable, so the ledger keeps the contradiction framed as claim vs counter-claim, not as a resolved fact. initial reporting via Bloomberg/Haaretz.

What to watch next

• Any US Treasury or State Department response — fresh sanctions designations would confirm the assessment.
• Satellite or shipping evidence of missile transfers.
• Iranian missile activity in the ongoing war: does tempo or targeting change?
• Whether Moscow's mediation offer at Ashgabat is real leverage or cover for arming.
• Whether Western governments sanction any of the numbered MOD agencies Reuters identified, whether Russia, China or other named origin states respond beyond the statements already recorded, and whether any finished-weapon delivery is tied to this procurement network rather than to the aviation-missile reporting in v14.

Evidence Drawer

Sources

Sources (13): Haaretz · Türkiye Today · C14 News · Zambian Observer · Reuters · Israel Hayom · Times of Israel · MENAFN (Trend) · Al Jazeera liveblog · Clash Report · Turkiye Today · Vijesti (carrying Reuters) · ghall (citing Reuters)

Revision history

• v1 — 2026-10-10 — Stack created from Bloomberg-via-Haaretz reporting (Oct 10, 2026). Russia-to-Iran missile supply; Iran retains capacity and stocks.
• v5 — 2026-10-12 — June arsenal assessment, 2,500-missile estimate, British navy vessel-attack figures, oil/charter price context.
• v6 — 2026-10-13 — Sunday Oct 11 ballistic-missile test-fires (Türkiye Today; C14 News); Bloomberg Economics 4,000-Shahed/2,000-missile tempo figures; Zambian Observer citing FT on Russian-supersonic-cruise-missile cooperation claim (alleged).
• v7 — 2026-10-13 — Trump (Truth Social, late Monday): does not believe China/Russia are helping Iran 'at all' — on-record statement contradicting the Bloomberg assessment tracked here.
• v8 — — v8: IDF raised alert level across all fronts amid reports of 30 Iranian ballistic missiles (Israel Hayom, attributed); Israeli officials say missile rebuilding slow/partial, no change in assessment (ToI/Channel 12); continued test-firing reported.
• v9 — — v9: Oct 11-13 IRGC mass missile/drone drills (Tehran, Alborz, Isfahan, Yazd) — first physical demonstration of the arsenal Western officials say survived U.S.-Israeli strikes; counts attributed to Iranian-linked media, unverified. Trump publicly pledged no attack on Iran before Nov 3 midterms, naming the rebuild window. No new primary evidence of Russian deliveries since the Oct 9 Bloomberg report.
• v10 — 2026-10-20 — Lavrov in Tehran: Russian specialists to return to US-damaged Bushehr plant; mediation "aimed at preventing the return of a large-scale war" (Al Jazeera, Rudaw).
• v11 — — v11: FM spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei denies any discussion of transferring enriched uranium to Russia during Lavrov's Tehran visit; calls speculation about a 400 kg / 60%-enriched removal deal 'entirely baseless' (Trend via MENAFN; APA — VERIFIED as his on-record remarks); notes Russia's constructive de-escalation role; cross-linked to Rezaei's no-exit statement (st-003 v54) and st-005.
• v12 — — v12: FT investigation (Oct 20 cover story) names covert C430L Russia-Iran supersonic cruise missile program — Rosoboronexport + NPO Mashinostroyenia assisting ramjet development since 2023; Iran built and flight-tested a ramjet engine; claims ATTRIBUTED, no operational weapon established, no government confirmation.
• v13 — — v13: Zelenskyy suggests Russia may have shared intelligence including satellite data with Iran (ATTRIBUTED, Ukrainian-official claim; no evidence, no Russian response); April imagery-survey claim now tied to presidential statement; Iran-to-Russia missile-transfer report held (single anonymous chain).
• v15 — 2026-11-01 — v15: Saturday evening: Army spokesman Akraminia (Tabnak/BitRun interview via AJ liveblog/Clash Report/Turkiye Today) — Su-35 purchase complete, training complete, jets due before the war, to arrive only after it ends; no jets arrived, no Russian comment. Extends v14's future-fleet line with a timeline; does not confirm v14's missile figure or any delivery.
• v16 — 2026-11-01 — v16: Sunday evening: Reuters investigation (carried by Vijesti Nov 1; ghall Oct 31 citing Reuters) — Iran's 5,000+ 'MOD' agency network imported at least $2bn of military-related goods since Jan 2025 despite US blockade/sanctions; MOD 346428 example (rocket fuel, explosives, drone/missile components, launcher-capable trucks, Jan 2025–June 2026); routes via Caspian from Russia, Central Asia overland, cargo flights from China; origins recorded as China, Russia, Germany; methodology: thousands of documents + ~19,000 import records with 240 Analytics; 4 experts confirm missile/drone usability; dual-use caveat carried; Treasury/China/UAE responses noted; Iran, Russian Defence Ministry, White House, CENTCOM did not respond. VERIFIED as Reuters' findings as carried; shipment records not independently re-checked. Does not confirm v14's 327-missile figure or any Su-35 delivery.